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HANDLING THE TURBULENCE CASE
MARC S. MOLLER*
LoRi B. LASSON*

I.

INTRODUCTION

S INCE THE WRIGHT brothers lifted off at Kitty Hawk, all pilots have encountered turbulent atmospheric conditions at
some time or another. Courts, as well, have grappled with cases
involving injuries sustained by passengers as a result of turbulence encounters since the 1930s. Although we have come a
long way this century in understanding the phenomena of the
effect of air turbulence on aircraft, determining airline liability
for the injuries sustained by a passenger injured during the
course of a turbulence encounter, particularly clear air turbulence, is still perplexing and remains the focus of a great deal of
litigation.
The litigation scenario usually involves a passenger injured in
an unannounced turbulence encounter. The claim is denied,
and the airline disclaims liability on one of two grounds: first,
that the turbulence could not have been reasonably anticipated,
or second, that the passenger failed to follow in-flight safety precautions or abide by timely warnings. The injuries caused by a
turbulence encounter range from minor to catastrophic.
As recently as October 7, 1999, a jury sitting in the United
States District Court for the Southern District of New York rendered a $2,225,000 verdict allocated among thirteen plaintiff
* Marc S. Moller is a partner with the law firm of Kreindler & Kreindler in
New York City. Lori B. Lasson is an associate with the firm.
The authors are indebted to Michael Smith, certified consulting meteorologist
and principal owner of WeatherData, Inc., 245 North Waco Street, Suite 310,
Wichita, Kansas, for his assistance in the preparation of this article. Mr. Smith
has been qualified and has testified as an expert in aviation accident litigation

including, for example, the recent litigation arising out of the crash of USAir
Flight 1016 in Charlotte, North Carolina on July 2, 1994. WeatherData, Inc. is
engaged in the business of providing meteorological and other weather information to the media and business enterprises on a contract basis.
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passengers (ten adults and three children), represented by Kreindler & Kreindler. The plaintiffs suffered emotional distress as
a result of twenty eight seconds of severe turbulence ranging
from positive two gs to negative one half g on American Airlines
Flight 58 from Los Angeles to JFK Airport on June 26, 1995.
The plaintiffs claimed that the American Airlines pilots should
have circumnavigated a thunderstorm in the area and should
have illuminated the seatbelt sign prior to encountering the turbulence. The flight required an emergency landing in Chicago.
American Airlines conceded liability on the eve of trial. Half of
the plaintiffs suffered from post-traumatic stress disorder and
the average award ranged between $150,000 and $215,000.1
In January 1997, two TWAjets trailing each other and bound
2
for St. Louis hit severe turbulence over Missouri's Bootheel.
The pilots of each plane declared emergencies. A flight attendant at the rear of one of the aircraft was thrown into the ceiling,
causing her head to burst through one of the panels. A passenger and four other flight attendants were treated for bumps and
bruises.
In March 1997, Mexicana Airlines Flight 199, en route from
Mexico to Chicago's O'Hare Airport, flew into clear air turbulence injuring four crew members and nineteen passengers.'
Also in March 1997, United Flight 2370, on its descent into Burbank, encountered severe air turbulence caused by the Santa
Ana Winds.4
"Center," the first officer radioed from the careening flight deck,
"do you, ah, have any indication how far down this goes?" Good
God, I thought, we're going to crash in the Northridge Fashion
Center. We didn't, of course, but more than a few ashen souls
walked off that plane convinced they'd cheated death.'
Not so lucky were the passengers on board American Airlines
Flight 242 on July 10, 1997 who sustained injuries in a turbu-

1 See Spielberg v. American Airlines, Inc., No. 96 Civ. 4763, 1997 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 11702 (N.Y. August 8, 1997).
2 See Christopher Carey, 2 TWA Flights Hit Turbulence; 6 Injured, ST. Louis POSTDISPATCH, Jan. 30, 1997, at 10A, available in 1997 WL 3320965.
s See Andrew Buchanan, Turbulence Adds a Shake Up Call to Air Travelers, CHICAGO TRIBUNE, Mar. 3, 1997, at 1, available in 1997 WL 3525742.
4 See Michael Walker, Angel Flight Turbulence, Los ANGELES TIMES MAG., Mar. 2,

1997, at 10, available in 1997 WL 2187335.
5 Id.
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lence encounter.6 Even worse was United Airlines Flight 826 on
December 28, 1997, in which one passenger was killed and approximately one hundred others were injured.7
There have been so many injuries caused by turbulence that
the investigators for the General Accounting Office (GAO), the
investigative arm of Congress, conducted an analysis of more
than 22,000 accidents from 1987 through 1996 for which the
National Transportation Safety Board (NTSB) had made findings of probable cause. More than twenty-five percent of these
accidents were weather related, and turbulence was the most frequent factor or cause cited in accidents involving major air
carriers.'
The Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) provides other
enlightening statistics concerning the frequency and potentially
fatal consequences of turbulence accidents:
" Approximately fifty-eight airline passengers are injured by
turbulence annually while not wearing seat belts. From 1981
through December 1997, major carriers reported 342 cases
of turbulence resulting in 3 deaths, 80 serious personal injuries and 769 minor injuries;
" Of the eighty passengers seriously injured, approximately
seventy-three were not wearing their seatbelts, and at least
two of the three death cases involved passengers who were
not wearing their seatbelts;
* Generally, two-thirds of the turbulence related accidents occurred above thirty thousand feet. In 1997, however, approximately half of the accidents occurred above thirty
thousand feet.9

6 See The National Transportation Safety Board, Aviation Accidents, NTSB Identification FTW971A261 (July 10, 1997) <http://www.ntsb.gov/aviation/FrW/
lnarr_97A261.htm>.
7 See Mark Hosenball, A FatalJolt over the Pacific, NEWSWEEK, January 12, 1998, at
34.
8 NTSB Reporter, Vol. 16, No. 7, July 1998. According to the GAO report,
71.4% of weather related air carrier accidents were caused by turbulence and
65% of air carrier injuries were caused by turbulence. Id., at 3, 6.
9 FAA, FactsAbout Turbulence (visited Aug. 29, 1999) <http://www.faa.gov/apa/
turb/Facts/fact.htn>. These statistics are provided as part of "Turbulence Happens," the FAA multimedia campaign to educate the public about turbulence, its
consequences, and methods to avoid injury.
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In 1996, the FAA launched a nationwide safety campaign to promote the use of safety belts throughout flights in an effort to
prevent turbulence related injuries.1"
With that as background, this article addresses the handling
of an air turbulence case. One point bears emphasis at the outset: the passenger can win his case if he can establish by a reasonable preponderance of the evidence that the turbulence was
foreseeable and that his injury could have been prevented,
avoided, or minimized. Most air turbulence injuries are avoidable, and airlines will be liable if pilots fail to take reasonable
precautions to detect and avoid meteorological conditions in
which a potential injury-causing turbulence encounter is likely.
First and foremost, lawyers must understand how to determine whether a turbulence case exists in the first place. They
must learn how to identify the nature of the turbulence in order
to assess whether the encounter was foreseeable. Among the
many questions to ask are: was the turbulence windshear, was it
microburst, was it related to a thunderstorm, was it associated
with precipitation, what time of year did it happen, where did it
happen, and what did the weather radar disclose or what could
it have disclosed if used properly? They must explore in depth
the weather conditions that prevailed in the vicinity of the turbulence encounter as well as along the flight path before and
after the encounter. They must determine whether the cockpit
crew should have been able to either avoid the turbulence altogether or warn the passengers in advance of the lurching of the
aircraft to avoid or minimize any injury or death. They must
search for the experiences of other aircraft traveling in the general vicinity of the one in question.
What may look like a clear air turbulence case at first glance,
in which the defendant can hide behind the claim of an unavoidable accident or act of God, may well turn out to be an
avoidable incident had the crew paid proper heed to the prevailing weather and warned the passengers. Increasing awareness
of the threat and damage of unexpected turbulence has caused
many airlines to mandate the use of seatbelts at all times passengers are seated and has prompted the recent Federal Aviation
Regulation requiring airlines to instruct passengers to keep
Launches Education Campaign to Raise Awareness About Turbulence, FAA
(U.S. Dep't of Transp.), Dec. 17, 1996, available in 1996 WL
732353. See Section III, infra regarding the current regulations applicable to
seatbelt use.
10 See FAA

NEws
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their seat belts fastened while seated. 1 ' This regulation's purpose, of course, is to promote safety. But while certainly not
conclusive, the regulation also provides some measure of a litigation defense. Passengers, however, are entitled and expected
to leave their seats, and turbulence caused injuries can be sustained even by seated passengers.
II.

A LESSON IN METEOROLOGY: UNDERSTANDING
THE BASICS OF TURBULENCE

The three principal causes of turbulence are convective currents, obstructions to wind flow, including mountain waves, and
windshear (or any combination of these conditions) .12 In addition, wake turbulence is also a significant cause of turbulence,
however, it is an aircraft operational phenomenon rather than a
pure meteorological event. Wake turbulence accidents usually
occur when large aircraft generate wing tip vortices during takeoff or landing, causing a smaller plane traveling too close to the
large plane to become uncontrollable and crash. 3 The standard air traffic controller warning, "caution wake turbulence," is
intended to alert trailing planes to keep their distance from
larger planes in front of them in order to allow the wake turbulence to dissipate. 4
A.

CONVECTIVE CURRENTS

Convective currents, a common cause of turbulence at low altitudes, are both ascending and descending vertical air movements. Like Sir Isaac Newton's law, "[t]o every action there is
11The Code of Federal Regulations now mandates the following: "After each
takeoff, immediately before or immediately after turning the seat belt sign off, an

announcement shall be made that passengers should keep their seat belts fastened, while seated, even when the seat belt sign is off." 14 C.F.R. § 121.571 (a) (2)
(1999).
Another regulation requires: "[T]he 'Fasten Seat Belt' sign shall be turned on
during any movement on the surface, for each takeoff, for each landing, and at
any other time considered necessary by the pilot in command." 14 C.F.R.
§ 121.317(b) (1999).
12

See FAA

FLIGHT STANDARDS SERVICE AND NATIONAL WEATHER SERVICE, ADvi-

SORY CIRCULAR

No. 00-6A, AVIATION WEATHER 80 (Rev. 1975) [hereinafter FSS

AVIATION WEATHER]; IRVIN

N.

GLEIM, AVIATION WEATHER AND WEATHER SERVICES

93 (1995).
15
14

after

See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 88.
FAA, ORDER 7110.65, AIR TRAmc CONTROL §§ 2-1-19, 3-9-7 (1999) [hereinAIR TRAFFIC CONTROL].
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always opposed an equal reaction,"' 5 for each1 6ascending current
there is a corresponding downward current.
Land and water surfaces heat the adjoining air differently.
For example, during the day, barren land radiates heat readily
while water and vegetation do so more slowly. The resulting
lack of uniform heating causes convective currents.' 7 On warm
summer afternoons when winds are light, convective currents
are quite active. As cold air moves over a warm surface, the air
becomes unstable at lower levels. Convective currents often extend several thousand feet above the surface causing rough,
choppy air. i" This is the reason, as most passengers are aware,
that flying above the cloud level produces a smoother ride than
flying immediately below it.
Convective currents can also create difficulty in landings because they affect the rate of descent.' 9 On approach to an airport, turbulence can cause abrupt changes in airspeed and may
require an increase or decrease in airspeed beyond normal approach speed. While this procedure seems to conflict with the
general rule of reducing airspeed for penetrating turbulence,
the approach speed is generally below that recommended for
turbulence penetration.2 °
When convection exists in higher altitudes, it produces large
cumulus and cumulonimbus clouds with anvil-like heads.2 '
These cumulonimbus provide a visual warning of potentially vio15 JOHN BARTLETT, FAMILIAR QUOTATIONS

282 (Justin Kaplan ed., 16th ed.

1992).
16 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 80-81. Naturally, for each ascending current, the descending current is not necessarily the same level of intensity or geographic size, and it may be located a distance away. See id. at 81.
17 FAA AND U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 61-23B, PILOT'S
HANDBOOK OF AERONAUTICAL KNOWLEDGE 109 (Rev. 1980) [hereinafter PILOT'S
HANDBOOK].

18 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 81.
19 See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 109.

See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 81.
There are generally two types of clouds, cumulus and stratus. Localized intense vertical currents lifting moist air to its condensation point create cumulus
clouds. Broad horizontal currents create stratus clouds, which means "spread
out." Clouds near the surface of the earth are usually called either cumulus or
stratus, unless they are causing precipitation, in which case the term "nimbus,"
which means rain cloud, is added. Clouds at intermediate heights (5,000-20,000
feet) are referred to as altostratus or altocumulus, with the added prefix "alto"
meaning high. Meteorologists refer to the "alto" cloud group as middle level
clouds. Clouds that form in the higher levels of the troposphere (20,000-50,000
feet) include the prefix "cirro," which means curly, because clouds at that level
have a curly appearance. See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 119.
20
21
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lent convective turbulence. 22 Convective currents can still be active, however, even in the absence of cumulus clouds if the air is
too dry for cumulus clouds to form.23 This has been referred to
as clear air turbulence (CAT), discussed in more detail in
section D.
B.

OBSTRUCTIONS TO AIRFLOW

Both man-made and natural obstructions interrupt otherwise
smooth wind flow creating mechanical turbulence. As wind
blows around an object or obstruction it forms eddies or gusts
with fluctuations in air speed and direction. 24 Mechanical turbulence fluctuates according to wind speed and the nature of
the obstruction. The greater the speed or rougher the surface,
the greater the turbulence. The physical appearance of the
clouds identifies whether the turbulence is caused by convective
or mechanical mixing. Rows or bands of stratocumulus clouds
indicate mechanical mixing, while a random pattern is consistent with convective clouds.2 5
Airports are particularly susceptible to mechanical turbulence, which naturally produces gusty surface winds. When flying in a low level approach, or climbing, airspeed changes can
be so rapid and drastic that an aircraft can even stall. Therefore, when gusty conditions prevail, the pilot must anticipate the
need for changes in airspeed by maintaining a margin of airspeed above normal approach. 26 The Pilot's Handbook of Aeronautical Knowledge recommends that landings and take-offs in
gusty conditions should be made at higher speeds in order to
maintain sufficient control.2 7
A quite different situation is caused when calm air crosses a
mountain barrier because wind flows across the barrier in layers
causing "mountain waves."' 28 These mountain waves can extend

100 miles or more downwind from the barrier. The waves remain relatively stationary while the wind blows through them,
22 Cumulonimbus clouds, which are extremely dangerous, sometimes take the
form of a continuous or virtually continuous line, caused by a front or squall line.
They can be extremely turbulent, in part, because they are formed by rising air
currents. See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 123.
23 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 81.
24 See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 109-13.
25 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 82-83.
26 See id. at 83.
27 See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 113.
28 See FSS AvWATION WEATHER supra note 12, at 83-84.
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and as such, are sometimes also called "standing" waves. Under
each wave crest is a circular rotation, called a rotor, which can
produce violent turbulence.29 Mountain wave turbulence is
prevalent when winds of forty knots or more blow across a
mountain or ridge. Reports of turbulence due to mountain
waves run the gamut from extremely minor to severe enough to
damage aircraft and injure passengers. Consequently, any degree of turbulence caused by a mountain range is possible and
should be anticipated.3
British Airways Board v. The Boeing Co.31 provides an example of
severe damage caused by mountain wave turbulence. A British
Airways aircraft disintegrated mid-air when it encountered severe CAT in the form of a mountain wave near Mt. Fuji, Japan
on March 5, 1966.32 British Airways claimed the accident was

due to a manufacturing defect, while Boeing claimed that the
"pilot flew close to Mt. Fuji at too low an altitude," causing it to
encounter CAT so extreme that it exceeded the design capabilities of the aircraft. 3 Boeing's motion for summary judgment
was granted because British Airways produced no evidence to
controvert Boeing's theory. 4
The FAA provides pilots with the following information and
recommended precautions associated with flying over mountainous terrain:
1. pay attention to visible cues;
2. turbulence can be expected when wind at mountain top level
exceeds twenty-five knots; extreme caution should be exercised when the component of the wind perpendicular to the
mountain range exceeds forty knots;
3. convective clouds on the windward side of a mountain indi-

cate unstable air and are consistent with turbulence on close
proximity to either side of the mountain;
4.
5.

standing lenticular and rotor clouds indicate a mountain
wave and turbulence can be expected many miles to the leeward side of the mountain;
when flying towards mountains from the leeward side, begin

the climb a great distance from the mountains-100 miles in
a mountain wave and thirty to fifty miles otherwise;
29
30

See id. at 83-85.
See id. at 85.

31 585 F.2d 946 (9th Cir. 1978).
32 See id. at 949.
33 Id. at 950.
34 See id. at 951.
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avoid flying through mountain passes and valleys in high
winds.3 5
C.

WINDSHEAR

Much has been written about windshear. Though it can be
deadly, many pilots do not fully appreciate the risks associated
with windshear. It has been a substantial factor in several tragic
and avoidable crashes and numerous deaths and injuries. Remarkably, during the period 1964 through 1986, at least thirtytwo accidents and incidents involving windshear have been documented, resulting in over 600 fatalities and nearly 250 injuries.3 6 These statistics prompted the FAA to publish the Pilot
Windshear Guide. 7

Among the many disasters involving windshear that have occurred in the last few years, some of the most notable include
the Delta Flight 191 crash at Dallas-Fort Worth on August 2,
1985, the Northwest 255 crash at the Detroit Metropolitan Airport on August 16, 1987, and the USAir Flight 1016 at Charlotte

International Airport on July 2, 1992.8
Windshear is an abrupt change "in wind speed and/or direction over a short distance." 9 It can be horizontal or vertical,
and it "generates eddies between two wind currents of differing
velocities. ''4 The differences may be in wind direction, speed,

or both.4 '
There are several causes of low level windshear, including
temperature inversions, frontal zones, and thunderstorms.42
See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 85-86.
See FAA AND U.S. DEP'T OF TRANSP., ADVISORY CIRCULAR No. 00-54, PILOT
WINDSHEAR GUIDE, App. 1, § 2.0 (Nov. 25, 1988) [hereinafter PILOT WINDSHEAR
35

36

GUIDE].
37

Id.

38 Many other crashes have been attributed to windshear, including the August

1975 crash of Continental Flight 426 in Denver, the July 1982 crash of Pan Am
Flight 759 in New Orleans, and the June 1975 crash of Eastern Airlines Flight 66
in New York (JFK).
39 Major John E. Richardson, Wind Shear, FLYING SA'ETY, Aug. 1981, at 5.
40 FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 86.
41 The FAA has defined windshear as "[a]ny rapid change in wind direction or
velocity, and 'severe windshear' as [a] rapid change in wind direction or velocity," causing airspeed changes greater than 15 knots or vertical speed changes
greater than 500 feet per minute." PILOT WINDSHEAR GUIDE, supranote 36, App.
1 § 2.2.
42 See FSS AVIATION WEATHER, supra note 12, at 86-87.
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High level CAT is associated with a jet stream or strong
circulation.43
1.

Windshear with a low-level temperature inversion

On a clear night with light surface winds, temperature inversions form near the earth's surface, and wind immediately above
the inversion can be rather strong. As an aircraft climbs or descends through the inversion, windshear can be encountered
close to the ground. The shear plane and gusty winds move
closer to the ground as the inversions dissipate.44
2.

Windshear in a frontal zone

Wind fluctuates abruptly in frontal zones, but not all fronts
necessarily have associated windshear. Usually, shear creates a
problem in fronts having steep wind gradients.45 Given that
windshear is most dangerous when it occurs close to the ground,
it is important to be able to calculate the approximate height of
the front above an airport.46 When the temperature across the
front at the surface is ten degrees Fahrenheit, and the front is
moving at thirty knots or more, there is a high likelihood that
windshear is present on approach.47
3.

Windshear associated with a thunderstorm

A violent and potentially devastating aspect of a thunderstorm
is the associated windshear. The winds surrounding a thunderstorm are "complex" and windshear can occur on all sides of a
cell.4" A rapid change and increase in wind at low levels immediately before the arrival of a thunderstorm produces what is
known as the "first gust" or the "gust front." These gusty winds
are caused by large downdrafts hitting the ground and spreadSee id. at 86-88. See also infra section D.
See Richardson, supra note 39, at 7. In the Southwest, in fact, a ninety degree
change in direction and a twenty or thirty degree increase in surface winds within
the space of a few minutes is not unusual. See id.
45 See id. at 5-6.
46 SeePILoT's HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 116. When a cold front is moving at
thirty or more knots, the frontal or windshear zone will usually be five thousand
feet above the airport approximately three hours after the frontal passage. When
a warm front is moving through an area close to an airport, windshear may exist
from the surface to five thousand feet, above ground level (AGL) approximately
six hours before the front passes the airport. See id.
47 See Richardson, supra note 39, at 6.
48 See PILOT'S HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 114.
43
44
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ing horizontally.49 Approach under these conditions can be
treacherous given the possibility of shear.
Much closer in proximity to the thunderstorm than the "first
gust" is a microburst that is an extremely powerful localized
downdraft from a thunderstorm." In some cases, the strength
of a microburst can exceed that of an aircraft. 51 As early as
1988, the FAA emphasized that "IT IS VITAL TO RECOGNIZE
THAT SOME MICROBURSTS CANNOT BE SUCCESSFULLY
ESCAPED WITH ANY KNOWN TECHNIQUES! '52 The dangers

associated with windshear cannot be overstated. Otherwise ordinary approaches can become dire emergencies in seconds.53
49 These gusty winds have been known to alter direction by as much as 180
degrees and achieve speeds of 100 knots ten miles ahead of a storm. Wind speed
may increase by as much as fifty percent between the surface and 1,500 feet,
presenting a potentially dangerous shear condition for a flight on approach. See
Richardson, supra note 39, at 6.
50 Microbursts are not only associated with thunderstorms. They also occur
with lighter precipitation corresponding to convective clouds and relatively dry
conditions of light rain or virga (precipitation which evaporates before reaching
the earth's surface). See PILOT WINDSHFAR GUIDE, supra note 36, App. 1 § 2.2.
51A downdraft can exceed 720 feet vertical velocity at 300 feet above ground
level. See id.
52 Id. App. 1 § 2.2.
53 The FAA has provided the following Microburst Windshear Guidelines:

TABLE I
MICROBURST WINDSHEAR PROBABILITY GUIDELINES
OBSERVATION

PROBABILITY
OF WINDSHEAR

PRESENCE OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER
NEAR INTENDED FLIGHT PATH:
With localized strong winds (Tower reports
or observed blowing dust, rings of dust,
tornado-like features, etc.)

HIGH

With heavy precipitation (Observed or
radar indications of contour, red or attenuation shadow)

HIGH

With rainshower

MEDIUM

With lightning

MEDIUM

With virga

MEDIUM

With moderate or greater turbulence
(reported or radar indications)

MEDIUM

With temperature/dew point spread
between 30 and 50 degrees Fahrenheit

MEDIUM

ONBOARD WINDSHEAR DETECTION
SYSTEM ALERT

HIGH
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PIREP OF AIRSPEED LOSS OR GAIN:
15 knots or greater
Less than 15 knots

HIGH
MEDIUM

LLWAS ALERT/WIND VELOCITY
CHANGE:
20 knots or greater
Less than 20 knots

HIGH
MEDIUM

LOW
FORECAST OF CONVECTIVE WEATHER
Id. App. 1 § 2.4.2. tbl. 1.
NOTE: These guidelines apply to operations in the airport vicinity
(within 3 miles of the point of takeoff or landing along the intended
flight path and below 1000 feet AGL). The clues should be considered
cumulative. If more than one is observed, the probability weighting
should be increased. The hazard increases with proximity to the convective weather. Weather assessment should be made continuously.
CAUTION: CURRENTLY NO QUANTITATIVE MEANS EXISTS FOR
DETERMINING THE PRESENCE OR INTENSITY OF MICROBURST
WINDSHEAR. PILOTS ARE URGED TO EXERCISE CAUTION IN
DETERMINING A COURSE OF ACTION.
Table 1, designed specifically for convection weather (thunderstorm,
rainshower, virga), provides a subjective evaluation of various observational clues to aid in making appropriate real time avoidance decisions.
The observation weighting is categorized according to the following
scale:
HIGH PROBABILITY:
Critical attention need [sic] to be given to this observation. A decision
to avoid (e.g., divert or delay) is appropriate.
MEDIUM PROBABILITY:
Consideration should be given to aoviding. Precautions are
appropriate.
LOW PROBABILITY:
Consideration should be given to this observation, but a decision to
avoid is not generally indicated.
Although encountering weather conditions described in Table 1 above
1000 feet may be less critical in terms of flight path, such encounters
may present other significant weather related risks. Pilots are therefore
urged to exercise caution when determining a course of action. Use of
Table 1 should not replace sound judgement in making avoidance
decisions.
Windshear clues should be considered cumulative. The probability for
each single observation is given. However, if more than one windshear
clue is observed, the total probability rating may be increased to reflect
the total set of observations.
Example:
Nearing destination, VIRGA is seen descending from high based
clouds over the airfield (MEDIUM PROBABILITY). Commencing approach, a PIREP is received indicating that another flight just experienced a 10 knot airspeed loss on final approach to the same airport
(MEDIUM PROBABILITY). Therefore, it would be appropriate to
raise the total avoidance decision weighting to HIGH PROBABILITY
(indicating a decision to avoid is appropriate).
Id. § 2.4.2.

[64
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Windshear can be vertical, horizontal, or both simultaneously.
Horizontal shear occurs when an aircraft flies through a windshift plane. Vertical shear occurs near the ground when a
change in velocity or direction "drastically alter[s] lift, IAS [indicated air speed], and thrust requirements and can exceed the
pilot's capability to recover."54 Vertical shear can also occur
aloft, especially near thunderstorm updrafts.
D.

CLEAR AIR TURBULENCE

Clear air turbulence (CAT) implies turbulence without
clouds. The term also is used to convey high level windshear
turbulence. CAT is different from storm related turbulence because it cannot be seen and lacks precipitation or other visual
cues to warn of its presence. CAT can toss a huge jet, like it did
to United Airlines Flight 826 cruising between Tokyo and Honolulu on December 28, 1997. 55
The jet stream is a narrow meandering river of winds moving
around the globe with wave-like motion. 6 To be considered a
jet stream, the concentrated winds must have a speed of at least
fifty knots.5 7 In the upper atmosphere, jet stream segments
move along pressure ridges and troughs. 8
A turbulent energy exchange, near the jet stream and along
the boundary between cold and warm air masses, creates CAT.
Since the greatest differentiation between warm and cold
weather exists in the winter, CAT is most prevalent during that
season.

59

CAT occurs most often in an upper trough on the polar or
cold side of the jet stream.6' That is to say, "it is most common
near upper air fronts and the tropopause, the thin layer of air
that marks the boundary between troposphere and stratosphere
and generally has a temperature of -55°C to -65°C."61 CAT also
54

Richardson, supra note 39, at 7.

55 See Hosenball, supra note 7, at 34. The Boeing 747 aircraft lurched up for

six seconds, then dropped several hundred feet, killing one passenger and injuring approximately one hundred others. See id.
- See GLEIM, supra note 12, ch. 13, at 145.
57 See id.
58 See id. at 146.
59 See id. at 148.
- See id.
61James T. McKenna, Rallyingfor Attack on Turbulence, AVIATION WK. & SPACE
TECH., July 27, 1998, at 41.

1070

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

frequently occurs along the jet stream north and northeast of a
62
quickly deepening surface low.
E.

MEASURING AND DETECTING TURBULENCE

The Federal Aviation Administration has provided the following guidelines to define the relative degree of turbulence:
" Light Intensity: "turbulence that momentarily causes slight,
erratic changes in altitude and/or attitude. Occupants may
feel a slight strain against seat belts or shoulder straps. Unsecured objects may be displaced slightly."6 3
* Moderate Intensity: "turbulence that is similar to light turbulence but of greater intensity. Changes in altitude and/or attitude occur but the aircraft remains in positive control.
Occupants feel definite strains against seat belts or shoulder
straps. Unsecured objects are dislodged. Walking and food
64
service are difficult."
" Severe Intensity: "turbulence causing large, abrupt changes in
altitude and/or attitude, usually causing large variations in indicated airspeed. Aircraft may be momentarily out of control.
Occupants are forced violently against seat belts or shoulder
straps. Unsecured objects are tossed about. Food service and
65
walking are impossible."
* Extreme Intensity: "turbulence in which the aircraft is violently tossed about and is practically impossible to control. It
may cause structural damage."66
1.

Clear Air Turbulence Detection

Conventional thinking has been that "pilots have no defense
against turbulence-especially the most treacherous type: clear
air turbulence ....

Today scores of researchers and safety advo-

cates are challenging that conventional thinking. With advances
in computing power and new schemes for deciphering its mysteries, they are pursuing ways to make turbulence obvious to airline crews. '' 67 These analytical tools are of critical importance to
aviation litigants because their use will enable litigants to know
whether an air turbulence injury or death claim has merit.
While methods for detecting CAT have advanced, pilot training
See GLEiM, supra note 12, at 148.
FAA AND U.S. DEP'T OF TRANsp., AERONAUTICAL INFORMATION
20, Tbl. 7-1-6 (1998) [hereinafter AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL].
62
63

- Id.
65 Id.
66 Id.

67

McKenna, supra note 61, at 40.
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and experience remain the principle tools available to predict
CAT.
One of the most significant tools being developed to detect
CAT is a Doppler laser radar device called a lidar. The lidar
beams forward from the aircraft's nose to sense the movement
of dust and natural aerosol particles in turbulent air several
miles ahead of the aircraft. When the beam strikes particles in
the air, it bounces back to the aircraft, showing different air patterns. Above 22,000 feet, however, where most large aircraft
cruise, there are few particles, moisture, or other pollutants that
the lidar can beam back to the aircraft.
The National Center for Atmospheric Research and NASA/
Dryden began a series of tests in March and April of 1998, using
the lidar built by Coherent Technologies, Incorporated. These
experiments may lead to the development of a "real-time lidar
turbulence detector for commercial aircraft."6 The lidar on a
NASA aircraft is capable of detecting turbulence a few seconds
before impact, but, this may not be sufficient time to avert the
potential disaster.
Some other notable gains in CAT detection are the gathering
of "truth data" to improve the forecasting of turbulence, and the
increasing budget dedicated to the aviation weather research
program.69 The WSR-88 Doppler weather radars, dubbed
NEXRAD, may also be used to predict turbulence. The
NEXRAD provides coverage of7 0more than 90% of the U.S. skies
at altitudes above 10,000 feet.
Northwest Airlines is credited with having the fewest turbulence encounters among the U.S. carriers, in large measure because of their in-house meteorological department that
produces turbulence plots. 71 Their meteorological department
prepares turbulence plots for six U.S. geographical regions, the
transatlantic region, and India. In addition, Northwest has a
team of meteorologists in Tokyo issuing turbulence plots for
Asia. These plots rank the anticipated turbulence on a zero-to6 Paul Proctor, Turbulence Radar Trials, AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Apr. 6,
1998, at 13.
69 See McKenna, supra note 61, at 40. "Truth data" is the collection during
routine airline flights of a wealth of data concerning the dimensions of the fields
of turbulence in real time. In 1997, the FAA had a budget of $3 million dollars.
Last year, the agency requested $12 million. See id.
70 See id. at 42.
71 See James Ott, Safety, Legal Concerns Shape Airline Policies, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 27, 1998, at 42.
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seven scale, with seven meaning extreme turbulence, identify
wind speed and direction, and indicate where the turbulence is
expected. Each area of turbulence is tagged either red or amber, red indicating to avoid the turbulence and amber indicating to watch the weather. It is important to note that Northwest
meteorologists find frequent correspondence between altocumulus standing lenticular clouds and clear air turbulence.72
2. Low Level Windshear Detection
Because windshear is frequently associated with thunderstorms, the best means to "detect" it is actually to avoid flying
near the thunderstorm system altogether. To do so, pilots
should rely on Pilot Reports (Pireps), the information available
on the in-flight radar as well as the obvious cues of thunderstorms visible to the cockpit crew out of the window.73
The FAA has long warned that the "best way a pilot can cope
with windshear is to: (a) Know it is there. (b) Know the magniSee James Ott, Turbulence Plot Gives Crews Ample Warning, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., July 27, 1998, at 68.
72

73 The FAA has spelled out a list of instructive "do's and don'ts" concerning
thunderstorm flying:
(1) Don't land or takeoff in the face of an approaching thunderstorm. A sudden gust front of low level turbulence could cause
loss of control.
(2) Don't attempt to fly under a thunderstorm even if you can see
through to the other side. Turbulence and windshear under
the storm could be disastrous.
(3) Don't fly without airborne radar into a cloud mass containing
scattered embedded thunderstorms. Scattered thunderstorms
not embedded usually can be visually circumnavigated.
(4) Don't trust the visual appearance to be a reliable indicator of
the turbulence inside a thunderstorm.
(5) Do avoid by at least 20 miles any thunderstorm identified as
severe or giving an intense radar echo. This is especially true
under the anvil of a large cumulonimbus.
(6) Do clear the top of a known or suspected severe thunderstorm
by at least 1,000 feet altitude for each 10 knots of wind speed at
the cloud top. This should exceed the altitude capability of
most aircraft.
(7) Do circumnavigate the entire area if the area has 6/10 thunderstorm coverage.
(8) Do remember that vivid and frequent lightning indicates the
probability of a strong thunderstorm.
(9) Do regard as extremely hazardous any thunderstorm with tops
35,000 feet or higher whether the top is visually sighted or determined by radar.
AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL, supra note

63,

7-1-26.
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tude of the change. (c) Be prepared to correct or go around." 74
In fact, the Pilot Windshear Guide, by the FAA, stresses:
The primary lesson learned is that the best defense against windshear is to avoid it altogether. This is especially important because shears will exist which are beyond the capability of any
pilot or airplane. In most windshear accidents, several cluesLLWAS [Low Level Windshear Alert System] alerts, weather reports, visual signs-were present that would have alerted the
flight crew to the presence of a windshear threat. In all instances, however, these clues were either not recognized or not
acted upon.
75

Therefore, one of the most critical means of avoidance is to
thoroughly evaluate the weather.76
The National Weather Service provides a wealth of weather
information in conjunction with the FAA. "Aerodrome forecasts
are prepared by approximately 100 Weather Forecast Offices
(WFOs). These offices prepare and distribute approximately
525 aerodrome forecasts [4] times daily for specific airports in
the 50 States, Puerto Rico, the Caribbean and Pacific Islands.
74 Major John E. Richardson, Wind Shear Part II, FLYING SAFETY, Sept. 1981, at
18 [hereinafter Richardson II].
75 Pilot Windshear Guide, supra note 36 § 2.3. The FAA's Pilot Windshear Guide
enumerates the many lessons learned from evaluating numerous windshear encounters during takeoff after liftoff, during takeoff on the runway, and during
approach. See id. §§ 2.3.1-2.3.3.
76 The complete "Air Traffic Control Package" can be requested at the regional office of the FAA Office in which the accident occurred. To obtain the
regional office address, write to the National Headquarters of the Federal Aviation Administration, 800 Independence Avenue, S.W., Washington, DC 20591.
The complete weather package including the weather for the entire route of the
aircraft can be obtained by writing to:
1) Director
National Climatic Data Center
Federal Building
151 Patton Avenue
Asheville, NC 28801-5001
Tel: (828) 271-4800

2) Director
National Oceanic & Atmospheric Administration
National Weather Service
SSMC2
1325 East-West Highway
Silver Springs, MD 20910
This package should include all forecasts, surface weather observation,
NOTAMS, PIREPS, SIGMETS, radar weather photographs and winds aloft.
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These forecasts
are valid for 24 hours and amended as
77
required.

The FAA also maintains a nationwide network of automated
Flight Service Stations to address the weather needs of pilots.
There are several weather observation programs that provide
important data in manual and automated fashion.
Manual remarks consist of reports from airport locations
staffed by FAA or National Weather Service employees who manually observe, calculate, and enter their observations into the
communication system. Manual Input remarks will include sky
conditions, visibility, weather and obstructions to vision, temper78
ature, dewpoint, wind, and altimeter setting.
The Automated Weather Observation System provides
weather conditions at a specific airport with minute-by-minute
weather observations. These automated observations evaluate
ceiling and sky cover, clouds, visibility, surface wind conditions
at the specific terminal, and obstructions or impairments to vision. Automated remarks will include density altitude, variable
9
visibility, and variable wind direction. 7
These manual and automated remarks can provide indispensable cues and warnings about potential turbulence encounters
at low altitudes or on landings.8 0 They will also provide additional clues for windshear, including references to thunderstorms, rainshowers, or blowing dust.
Large differences between the temperature and dewpoint
spread will warn pilots of low humidity. Dew point is very significant to pilots because it represents an important condition of
the air. Water vapor condenses and becomes visible as temperature reaches the dewpoint. The water vapor then becomes dew
or frost on the landing surface and becomes fog, clouds, rain, or
snow in the air.81
77 AERONAUTICAL INFO. MANUAL,

supra note 63,

7-1-1 (b).

78 See id. at
7-1-10.
79 See id.
80 The FAA provides a pamphlet, entitled "NOTAM AND WEATHER CON-

TRACTIONS TRANSLATOR," which defines the commonly used contractions
for area forecasts, SIGMETS and other weather information. The pamphlet can
be requested by writing to:
Federal Aviation Administration
Air Traffic Publications Branch, ATX-420
Room 428
800 Independence Avenue, S.W.
Washington, D.C. 20951
81 PILOT's HANDBOOK, supra note 17, at 118.
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Weather Advisories, Radar, and Other Means of Detecting
Turbulent Conditions

The National Weather Service issues a variety of weather advisories that serve to alert pilots of the possibility of encountering hazardous weather conditions. These advisories include
Severe Weather Forecast Alerts (AWWs), Significant Meteorological Information or SIGMETs (WSs), Convective SIGMETs
(WSTs), Center Weather Advisories (CWAs), and Airmen's Meterological Information or AIRMETS (WAs).82 To evaluate the
risk of windshear, each of the above alerts should be fully explored, as well as the Low Level Windshear Alert System
(LLWAS), visual observations from the cockpit, Pilot Reports
(PIREPs), and Airborne Weather Radar.
a.

Severe Weather Forecast Alerts (AWWs)

Pilots should always pay attention to aviation severe weather
forecasts. Severe weather forecasts are unscheduled messages
identifying areas of possible severe thunderstorms or tornados.
Air Route Traffic Control Centers (ARTCC) broadcast the forecasts on all frequencies, except the emergency frequency, when
any of the weather conditions alerted to is within 150 miles of
the airspace under their jurisdiction.
b.

SIGMETs (WSs)

SIGMETs are unscheduled in-flight advisory forecasts that
warn of the development of hazardous weather conditions.
SIGMETs are critical to all types of aircraft and specify the period for which the advisory is valid.
A SIGMET will be issued by the Aviation Weather Center
when any of the following exist: "(1) Es] evere or extreme turbulence, or clear air turbulence (CAT) not associated with thunderstorms; (2) [s] evere icing not associated with thunderstorms;
(3) [d]uststorms, sandstorms, or volcanic ash lowering surface
or inflight visibilities to below three miles; or (4) [v]olcanic
eruption. ' 3
c.

Convective SIGMETs

Three convective SIGMET bulletins covering the Eastern,
Central, and Western United States are issued. Each convective
82
83

See AERONAUTICAL INFo.
Id. 7-1-5(e).

MANUAL,

supra note 63,

7-1-5(a).
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SIGMET bulletin will (1) be comprised of one or more
SIGMETs, (2) be valid for two hours (unless it is superseded),
and (3) contain a forecast or an observation and a forecast.84
Convective SIGMETs are issued for forecasts of any of the following weather conditions (1) severe thunderstorms expected
to produce, surface winds greater than or equal to 50 knots, hail
of 3/4 inches or greater in diameter, or tornadoes; (2) embedded thunderstorms; (3) a line of thunderstorms; or (4) thunderstorms greater than or equal to VIP level 4 intensity affecting
40% or more of an area at least 3,000 square miles.85
d. AIRMETs (WAs)
Airmen's Meteorological Information may be important to
any pilot, and are issued every six hours for all domestic air
space. They are based on forecasts of moderate icing or turbulence, sustained winds greater then thirty knots or within
1,000 feet of the surface, and extensive areas of visibility below
three miles. They are of special significance to pilots without
instrument ratings.86
e.

Center Weather Advisories (CWAs)

Center Weather Advisories are unscheduled in-flight, flow
control, and air crew advisories. They have a short lead time
and are issued to supplement a SIGMET, Convective SIGMET,
or AIRMET that has already been issued. They will also be issued when either (1) an in-flight advisory has not been issued,
but based on current pilot reports, weather conditions meet
SIGMET or AIRMET requirements; or (2) when weather conditions do not meet SIGMET or AIRMET requirements, but pilot
reports or other sources of weather information indicate that
present or anticipated meteorological conditions will adversely
87
affect the safe flow of traffic.
f. The Federal Aviation Administration's Windshear
Detection Plan
The FAA now uses an integrated plan for windshear detection
to improve the safety and capability of most airports. The plan
integrates the Terminal Doppler Weather Radar (TDWR), the
Weather System Processor (WSP), and the Low Level Windshear
See id.
85 See id.
86 See id.
87 See id.
84

7-1-5(d) (2).
7-1-5(c)(1)-(4).
7-1-5(h).
7
-1-5(g).
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weather conditions, turbulence of moderate degree or greater,
and windshear.91
i.

Turbulence PIREPs

Pilots are encouraged to report turbulent conditions to Air
Traffic Control as soon as is practicable, and should indicate the
following "(1) [a]ircraft location, (2) [t]ime of occurrence in
UTC, (3) [tlurbulence intensity, (4) [w]hether the turbulence
occurred in or near clouds, (5) [a]ircraft altitude or flight level,
(6) [t]ype of aircraft, [and] (7) [d]uration of turbulence" (this
may be based on time between two locations or over one location) .92 The classification of intensity should correspond to that
previously enumerated earlier in Section II E.93 The pilot
should also report the duration in the following terms: occasional - less than 1/3 of the time; intermittent - 1/3 to 2/3; con-

tinuous-more than 2/3.o4

ii. ClearAir Turbulence PIREPs
The Aeronautical Information Manual emphasizes that "CAT
has become a very serious operational factor to flight operations
at all levels and especially to jet traffic flying in excess of 15,000
feet."95 Consequently, all pilots experiencing CAT conditions
are urged to report the time, locations, and intensity (light,
moderate, severe or extreme) as quickly as practicable.96
iii. Windshear PIREPs
As unexpected changes in direction and wind speed can
wreak havoc on departing and arriving aircraft at low altitudes,
pilots are urged to make prompt reports of any windshear conditions they experience. The accepted reporting method is to
identify the specific gain or loss in airspeed and the respective
altitudes at which the plane experienced the change in
97
airspeed.
91
92

93
94
95

96
97

See AERONAUTICAL INFO.
Id. 7-1-20(a).
See id., tbl. 7-1-26.
See id.
Id. 7-1-22.
See AERONAUTICAL INFO.
See id. at 7-1-21(b).

MANUAL,

supra note 63,

7-1-18(a).

MANUAL,

supra note 63,

7-1-22.
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Not all airports in the United States have an LLWAS. In fact,
LLWAS was incorporated in only 110 airports in the United
States in 1988. Many of these systems have been replaced by
advanced technology including TDWR and WSP. While all
LLWAS systems will eventually be phased out, thirty-nine airports will be upgraded to the LLWAS-NE (Network Expansion),
the latest software and sensor technology. 9 This system continues to provide controllers with windshear warnings and alerts,
and provides the location of the hazard in relation to the runway. The system can accommodate as many as thirty-two sensors
located at an airport.
Currently windshear and microburst information and warnings are shown on ribbon display terminals in the tower cabs.
Because data is standardized in the LLWAS, TDWR, and WSP
systems, the controller does not interpret the data, but rather
simply reads the displayed information directly to the pilot.
g.

Visual Observations From the Cockpit

Because microbursts often occur in convective weather conditions, such as those presenting cumulus clouds, thunderstorms,
rain showers, and virga, microburst windshear can be indicated
by some of these obvious visual clues. Microburst windshear
may also be indicated by rain "accompanied by curling outflow,
a ring of blowing dust or localized dust in general, flying debris,
virga, a rain core with rain diverging away horizontally from the
rain core or tornadic features (funnel clouds, tornados)."9 0
h.

Pilot Reports (PIREPs)

PIREPs are the direct perceptions of the pilots who have observed cloud types and turbulence during actual flights. PIREPs
issued from the cockpits of commercial aircraft concerning abrupt airspeed changes on approach can indicate the presence of
windshear. Their reports of current weather conditions of turbulence are also critical to aid meteorologists in creating
forecasts.
FAA air traffic facilities must ask for PIREPs when the following weather is reported or forecast: ceilings at or below 5,000
feet, visibility at or below 5 miles, thunderstorms and related
89 See id. at

7-1-31.

90 See PILOT WINDSHEAR GUIDE,

supra note 36, App. 1, at 329.
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weather conditions, turbulence of moderate degree or greater,
and windshear. 9 1
i.

Turbulence PIREPs

Pilots are encouraged to report turbulent conditions to Air
Traffic Control as soon as is practicable, and should indicate the
following "(1) [a]ircraft location, (2) [t]ime of occurrence in
UTC, (3) [t]urbulence intensity, (4) [w]hether the turbulence
occurred in or near clouds, (5) [a] ircraft altitude or flight level,
(6) [t]ype of aircraft, [and] (7) [d]uration of turbulence" (this
may be based on time between two locations or over one location) .12 The classification of intensity should correspond to that
previously enumerated earlier in Section II E.9
The pilot
should also report the duration in the following terms: occasional - less than 1/3 of the time; intermittent - 1/3 to 2/3; continuous-more than 2/3.94
ii.

Clear Air Turbulence PIREPs

The Aeronautical Information Manual emphasizes that "CAT
has become a very serious operational factor to flight operations
at all levels and especially to jet traffic flying in excess of 15,000
feet."9 5 Consequently, all pilots experiencing CAT conditions
are urged to report the time, locations, and intensity (light,
moderate, severe or extreme) as quickly as practicable. 9 6
iii.

Windshear PItEPs

As unexpected changes in direction and wind speed can
wreak havoc on departing and arriving aircraft at low altitudes,
pilots are urged to make prompt reports of any windshear conditions they experience. The accepted reporting method is to
identify the specific gain or loss in airspeed and the respective
altitudes at which the plane experienced the change in
97
airspeed.
See AERONAUTICAL INFO.
Id. 1 7-1-20(a).
93 See id., tbl. 7-1-26.
94 See id.
95 Id.
7-1-22.
96 See AERONAUTICAL INFO.
97 See id. at
7-1-21(b).
91

MANUAL,

supra note 63,

1 7-1-18(a).

MANUAL,

supra note 63,

7-1-22.
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Weather Radar Services

The National Weather Service utilizes a "network of radar
sites for detecting coverage, intensity, and movement of precipitation. 9 8 Scheduled observations are made on an hourly basis
for flight planning purposes.9 9 The National Center for Environmental Prediction collects the information disseminated in
the reports and uses it to prepare national summary radar
charts. 10 It is important to know, however, that clouds and fog
are not detected by the radar and that a clear radar display does
not necessarily mean that there is no significant weather or turbulence in the area covered by the radar site.1" 1
Access to weather radar displays is available in several locations. The center weather service units in ARTCCs have access
to the weather radar displays. Additionally, all en route flight
advisory service facilities have the capability to access the radar
10 2
displays from individual weather radar locations.
j.

Airborne Weather Radar

Airborne weather radar should be used routinely to evaluate
the presence of convective cells. Although incapable of detecting windshear, airborne weather radar is a critical tool for
avoiding thunderstorms. Heavy precipitation pictured on the
radar associated with the visible clues of convective clouds indicates the possibility of microbursts. In addition, some airborne
radars can detect some types of turbulence in precipitation.
III.

THE SEATBELT RULE

The Federal Aviation Regulations specify that no one can operate an airplane unless: "(a) [T] here are available during the
takeoff, enroute flight, and landing... (2) [a] n approved safety
belt for separate use by each person on board the airplane who
has reached his second birthday ....",103 "In an effort to avoid
injuries caused by turbulence... American, United and Alaska
airlines ... require passengers to keep lap belts fastened when98 Id. at

7-1-11(a).

99 See id.

7-1-11 (b).

100 See id.
101 See id.

7-1-11(c).

102
103

7-1-11(d).
14 C.F.R. § 121.311(a)(2) (1999).
See id.
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ever they are seated. ' 10 4 Many other airlines have followed this
practice. This policy, prompted by serious turbulence-related
injuries, has been in place since late spring, 1988. Nonetheless,
the FAA has not made the requirements mandatory. Instead,
the Code of Federal Regulations now mandates that "[a]fter
each takeoff, immediately before or immediately after turning
the seat belt sign off, an announcement shall be made that passengers should keep their seat belts fastened, while seated, even
when the seat belt sign is off."10 Another regulation requires
that "[t]he 'Fasten Seat Belt' sign shall be turned on during any
movement on the surface, for each takeoff, for each landing,
and at any 06
other time considered necessary by the pilot in
1
command."
IV. THE APPLICABLE LAW
A.

REs IPSA LOQUITUR

The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur'0 7 has been addressed in numerous turbulence cases. Res ipsa loquitur generally applies
when:
a. the occurrence resulting in the injury was such as does not
ordinarily happen if those in charge use due care;
b. the instrumentalities involved were under the exclusive management and control of the defendant;
c. and the defendant possesses superior knowledge or means of
information as to the cause of the occurrence. 08
In the absence of any questions of fact, the jury resolves these
questions. 109
The doctrine has been successfully applied in a few aviation
cases," 0 but has been generally unavailable in turbulence cases.
- Edward H. Phillips, Three U.S. Airlines Adopt Seat Belt Rule, AVIATION WK. &
SPACE TECH., Apr. 6, 1998, at 60.
105 14 C.F.R. § 121.571(a) (2) (1999).
06 14 C.F.R. § 121.317(b) (1999).
107 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur has been rejected by many states as inap-

propriate for turbulence cases. See LEE S.

KREINDLER, AVIATION ACCIDENT LAW

§ 2.09 (Mathew Bender, revised 1998).
108 Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., 254 S.W.2d 662, 665-66 (Mo. 1953);
see also Kohler v. Aspen Airways, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 720, 723 (1985).
-o See Cudney, 254 S.W.2d at 666.
110 See, e.g., Lobel v. American Airlines, 192 F.2d 217 (2d. Cir. 1951). In Lobel,
the aircraft engines stopped abruptly, and res ipsa loquitur was applied because
the defendant airline had exclusive control of the aircraft and the accident was
not one which ordinarily happens without someone's negligence. Id. at 219-20.
The doctrine was also successfully invoked in several cases in the 1950's. See Hass-
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As early as 1946, the doctrine was rejected as inappropriate in
turbulence cases.'1 ' In Cudney v. Midcontinent Airlines, Inc., Mrs.

Cudney was thrown from her seat and suffered personal injuries
when the aircraft encountered turbulence. Although the
seatbelt signal was lit, Mrs. Cudney was not wearing her
seatbelt. 112 In refusing to apply res ipsa loquitur, the court
stated:
The concern here is with the first element, whether the occurrence, the sudden and violent jerking, jolting drop of the plane,
causing the plaintiff to be thrown from her seat, was one which
ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence ....
... [I] t

is urged that the defendants may have been negligent in

flying in the thundershower area and in the path of the downdraft, if in fact the downdraft was the cause of the sudden and
unusual movement of the plane. But, there is no evidence that
flying conditions were abnormal or that there was any hazard attached to flying in the wide thundershower area or that it was
possible to forecast danger of flying into downdrafts under the
prevailing conditions. There is no evidence that deviation from
course or any other action on the part of the pilots would have
either anticipated or avoided the downdraft, if that caused the
dropping movement of the plane. 'It appears now to be common knowledge with regard to the operation of airplanes that
downdrafts, which vary in effect according to their extent, are
not uncommon. It is true that such a manifestation of nature,
like the weather, is commonly referred to as an act of God ....In

short, it is not possible at this date, as it may be in another day, to
say that it is the common experience of mankind that commercial airliners do not lurch and drop for some distance except for
negligence in the operation of the plane and, therefore, it is not
now possible to confidently apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to the mere occurrence in the circumstances relied upon by
Mrs. Cudney, as it is in the instance of certain crashes,-there is
now no such balance of probabilities.' 13
In another turbulence case, the California Court of Appeals
rejected the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine because "an injury arising from an encounter with air turbulence
man v. Pacific Alaska Air Express, 100 F. Supp. 1 (D. Alaska 1951), affd sub nom.

Des Marais v. Beckman, 198 F.2d 550 (9th Cir. 1952) (unexplained disappear-

ance of an aircraft); Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Rowe, 226 F.2d 365 (8th Cir.
1955) (unexplained crash of airplane into mountain).
III See Cudney, 254 S.W.2d at 667.
112

See id. at 663-64.

113

Id. at 666-67 (quoting Small v. Transcontinental & W. Air, 216 P.2d 36, 37

(Cal. Ct. App. 1950)).
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cannot be said to ordinarily occur only because defendant was
negligent."114
In a more recent case applying New York law, the court for
the Southern District of New York refused to apply res ipsa loquitur where the plaintiff was injured due to clear air turbulence. The court reasoned that because the doctrine does not
apply where there is unexpected CAT, the plaintiff had to establish that the pilot should have foreseen the turbulence and
115
taken steps to avert it.
A host of other cases also reconfirm the commonly held position that res ipsa loquitur will not apply in turbulence cases." 6
These cases universally reject the notion that turbulence can be
avoided and that the crew can take measures to avoid the turbulence. It is critical, therefore, that the plaintiff focus on establishing the negligence of the crew and therefore avoid the need
to succeed on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.
B.

ESTABLISHING THE NEGLIGENCE OF THE AIRLINE

In Ness v. West Coast Airlines, the plaintiff was ejected from his
seat when the plane suddenly dipped while the fasten seat belt
sign was turned off.'
At the close of plaintiffs evidence, the
trial court granted the defendant's motion for a directed verdict. In remanding for a new trial, the appellate court recounted the evidence that tended to show meteorological
conditions consistent with air turbulence: cumulonimbus clouds
south of the departure city moving in the direction of the flight,
Kohler, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 725.
"5 See Karuba v. Delta Air Lines, Inc. 23 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,470 (S.D.N.Y.
1991). The court also determined that it was not necessary for the captain to
illuminate the seatbelt sign because the weather briefings prior to takeoff showed
no thunderstorm activity en route. Id. at 17,471-72.
116 See, e.g., Kelly v. American Airlines, Inc. 508 F.2d 1379 (5th Cir. 1975)
(holding that where air turbulence was caused by either weather conditions or
wake turbulence, both of which could not be avoided, the doctrine of res ipsa is
inappropriate); Gafford v. Trans-Texas Airways, 299 F.2d 60 (6th Cir. 1962)
(holding that res ipsa loquitur is unavailing because the turbulence that caused
the aircraft to lurch was not claimed to be caused by the negligence of the crew
in operating the aircraft); Lazarus v. Eastern Air Lines, Inc., 292 F.2d 748, 750
(D.C. Cir. 1961) ("The dip of an airplane in flight which was only sharp enough
to upset a cup of tea is not an incident which probably would not have happened
unless the pilot had been negligent.") (emphasis added); Ness v. West Coast Airlines, 410 P.2d 965 (Idaho 1965); see also, Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. Silber, 324
F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1963).
117 410 P.2d at 966.
114
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a low pressure area along the course of the flight,1 8and the turbulence located over rough mountainous terrain.'
In evaluating the meteorological evidence, the court stated:
The evidence would support a finding that the sudden downward
movement of the plane was caused by air turbulence, which defendant should have anticipated, and that defendant's failure to
warn plaintiff of the probability of such motion, and the consequent failure of plaintiff to use his seat belt, was sufficient to establish causal connection between defendant's failure to warn
plaintiff and the resultant injury.' 19
Proving negligence in turbulence cases is rarely that easy. In
Schultz v. American Airlines, 20 the plaintiff claimed that the turbulence "was so extreme that he was thrown repeatedly against
his seat belt and the seat partition causing his spleen to bleed
and eventually rupture."12 1 The passenger who sat next to

Schultz testified that the flight was uneventful, and others
aboard the aircraft testified that there was some "bumpiness,"
but not to the degree described by Schultz. A maintenance log
indicated that, "[i] n flight during turbulence, yellow aft air stair
light illuminated.'

22

After the jury was deadlocked at five to

one following one and a half days of deliberation, the trial court
23
granted American's motion for a directed verdict.
In Kohler v. Aspen Airways, 24 the applicable weather forecast
predicted occasional moderate turbulence within 5,000 feet
throughout Nevada. When the plane entered the Tahoe region
at about 10,000 feet, it fell some 500 feet in a few seconds, causing the plaintiff, who was belted in, to injure her neck. 25 Finding for the defendant, the jury believed the defendant's
witnesses, all of whom testified that the turbulence was unex26
pected and could not have been avoided.'
In Stiles v. NationalAirlines, 27 an aircraft crashed off the coast
of Alabama losing all of its 41 passengers and crew of five. The
court held that the accident was caused by the airline using dis11

See id. at 967.

119 Id.
120
121
122

123 See
124
125

126
127

at 968.

901 F.2d 621, 622 (7th Cir. 1990).
Id. at 622.
Id., at 623-24.
id. at 621, 624.
214 Cal. Rptr. 720 (1985).
See id. at 721-22.
Id. at 722.
161 F. Supp. 125, 130 (E.D. La. 1958).
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patchers who were not trained in meteorology and incapable of
appreciating turbulent weather conditions and forecasts. The
dispatchers also failed to advise the crew of prior turbulent
weather reports in the vicinity of the accident, and permitted
the flight to proceed in a route that was unsafe for air travel in
light of the known severe turbulent conditions. 12' Therefore,
establishing the negligence of an airline is easier where the turbulence is foreseeable and either could have12 9 been avoided or
the passengers could have been forewarned.
C.

THE CONCURRENT DUTIES OF PILOTS AND AIR
TRAFFIc CONTROLLERS

1.

There is a delicate marriagebetween pilots and air traffic
controllers

The duties and responsibilities of every air traffic controller
are defined and circumscribed by the Air Traffic Control Handbook, the purpose of which is stated as follows: "Controllers are
required to be familiar with the provisions of this order that pertain to their operational responsibilities and to exercise their
best judgment if they encounter situations not covered by it." 3°
As most manuals do, the Air Traffic Control Handbook proceeds from the general to the specific. Significantly, section 2.2
of the Handbook defines the duties and priorities in the following terms:
2-1-2. DUTY PRIORITY
a. Give first priority to separating aircraft and issuing safety alerts
as required in this order. Good judgment shall be used in prioritizing
all other provisions of this order based on the requirements of the

situation at hand.
NoteBecause there are many variables involved, it is virtually impossible to develop a standard list of duty priorities that would apply
uniformly to every conceivable situation. Each set of circumstances must be evaluated on its own merit, and when more than
one action is required, the controllers shall exercise their best judgment

based on the facts and circumstances known to them. That action which is most critical from a safety standpoint is performed
first. 131
128 See id.
129 See Ness v. West Coast Airlines, 410 P.2d 965, 969 (Idaho 1965).
130 Ronald E. Morgan, Foreword to AIR TRAFImc CONTROL, supra note 14.
13, Id. at 2-1-2a (emphasis added).
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These provisions lay the groundwork for cases in which the
plaintiff claims the government is at fault for an air crash. Air
traffic controllers must provide accurate information and warn132
ings in accordance with the Air Traffic Control Handbook.
In some circumstances, an air traffic ccntroller is held to a
superior duty of care to the pilot. In Ingham v. Eastern Air Lines,

Inc.,1 3 the court determined that the air traffic controllers negligently failed to accurately report current and deteriorating
weather conditions at the airport of the intended landing to the
crew of the aircraft. The trial judge found that the air traffic
controllers' "duty" was properly articulated in the Air Traffic
Control Procedure Manual then in force, which provided:
At locations where official weather reports are obtained by the
controllers through routine procedures and the ceiling and/or
visibility is reported as being at or below the highest "circling
minima" established for the airport concerned, a report of current
weather conditions, and subsequent changes, as necessary, shall be
transmitted as follows: ....
By approach control facilities, to all aircraft at the time of the
first radio contact or as soon as possible thereafter ....134
The appellate court determined that the words "as necessary" in
the regulation imposed a duty upon air traffic controllers to ad-

vise the crew of the descending aircraft that weather conditions
135
at the airport were deteriorating.
Similarly, in Gill v. United States1 36 the court held that while the
"primary responsibility for the safe operation of the aircraft" belongs to the pilot, providing an incomplete or inaccurate reporting of weather information will give rise to liability if it is found
to be a "proximate cause of the crash. ' 13' A common law duty to

warn may exist where the controller
knows of a danger reason138
ably within his knowledge.

The level of care naturally increases in accordance with the
level of danger presented under the circumstances. Conse132 See In re Air Crash Disaster Near Ceritos, Cal., 23 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,448,
17,452 (C.D. Cal. 1989).
133 373 F.2d 227, 233 (2d Cir. 1967).
134 Id., at 233 (alteration in original) (quoting FAA, AIR TRAFFFIC CONTROL

PROCEDURES MANUAL §

135See

265.2).

id. at 240.
136 285 F. Supp. 253 (E.D. Tex. 1968) affd, 449 F.2d 765 (5th Cir. 1971).
137 Id. at 256, 260; see alsoJatkoe v. United States, 19 Av. Cas. (CCH) 17,833
(E.D. Mich. 1985).
138 See Gill, 285 F. Supp. at 260.
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quently, a higher level of care is required when an aircraft is in
immediate and extreme danger, when the controller is in a superior position to judge that danger, when a pilot declares an
emergency or states that he's in distress, or when the pilot has
relied on the controller for certain explicit information.
In a Fifth Circuit wake turbulence case, the court emphasized
that the controllers had a superior duty to warn the pilot of the
danger of wake turbulence because of their superior position
for observing the level of danger to a small aircraft taking off in
the wake of a larger plane.139 When such information is within
the unique knowledge of the air traffic controllers, their failure
to communicate such information may give rise to liability.
In 1974, for example, the Tenth Circuit was quick to affirm
the trial court in finding the government negligent for failing to
warn a pilot of a small aircraft that he was flying too close to a
larger TWA 707jet, and thus was likely to encounter wake turbulence.14 ° The court reasoned:
[T]he pilot Yates was peculiarly susceptible to the control of the
controllers since he was piloting a light plane in between heavy
jets. Once he received and followed the controller's instructions
with respect to landing he was not free to disregard the directions given and exercise independent initiative. For all practical
purposes, he was in complete control of the tower. The hazardous traffic pattern, the direction which enhanced the danger and
the failure to direct as to turbulence all contributed to the tragic
result."'

Similarly strong language was used in another wake turbulence case in which the Hawaii District Court held the government partially at fault:
Discretion and judgment should have been exercised by the controllers to avoid this acute and obvious hazard, whereas [the]
Chief Controller ...

emphatically testified that he did not con-

sider that he had any duty, and did not even attempt, to exercise
any judgment or discretion whatsoever, beyond giving the stereotyped routine cautionary language of the book. These consideraCourt's finding of negligence on the part of
tions reinforce this
142
government.
the
See Hartz v. United States, 387 F.2d 870, 872 (5th Cir. 1968).
M4SeeYates. v. United States, 497 F.2d 878 (10th Cir. 1974).
141 Id. at 883.
142 Furumizo v. United States, 245 F. Supp. 981, 1012 (D. Haw., 1965), affd,
381 F.2d 965 (9th Cir. 1967). Note, that the court held the company that gave
139
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Similarly, in Hensley v. United States,143 the court determined
that air traffic controllers may be held liable for failing to provide information that is reasonably apparent to the controller
and not apparent to the pilot when the controller is in a better
position to assess the danger to the pilot.1" The government
has been held responsible in numerous other wake turbulence
cases." ' The government also conceded liability in two cases
arising out of the crash of USAir Flight 1016 on July 2, 1994, in
146
the United States District Court in Columbia, South Carolina.
Air traffic controllers have also been held negligent for failing
to relay weather information that a pilot had requested. 147 A
wealth of cases have held that despite air traffic control negligence, the sole responsibility for an aircrash rests with the pilot.
It is well known that the pilot-in-command is the final authority
regarding the safe conduct of a flight and operation of the aircraft. The extent of this responsibility is codified in the Federal
Aviation Regulations (FARs). FAR 91.3 provides in pertinent
part:
(a) The pilot in command of an aircraft is directly responsible
for, and is the final authority as to, the operation of that aircraft.

(b) an in-flight emergency requiring immediate action, the pilot
in command may deviate from any1 48rule of this part to the extent
required to meet that emergency.

The numerous cases addressing this issue demonstrate that
the pilot is the one in charge. Even despite inadequate weather
information from air traffic controllers, courts have often held
that full responsibility for air crashes rests with the pilot as the
final authority. In Hensley, for example, the plane "crashed
shortly after the pilot reported encountering... heavy turbulence. '' 149 Although the personal representatives of the survivors

alleged that the air traffic controllers were negligent in permitting the aircraft to fly into a thunderstorm, or soliciting and proflying instructions to the pilot fifty percent responsible as well for failing to furnish an adequately trained instructor. Id.
143 728 F. Supp. 716 (S.D. Fla. 1989).
144 See id. at 723; see also Hartz 387 F.2d at 873 (superior knowledge of air traffic
controller to evaluate danger of wake turbulence).
145 See, e.g., Neal v. United States, 562 F.2d 338 (5th Cir. 1977); Dickens v.
United States, 545 F.2d 886 (5th Cir. 1977).
146 See In re Air Crash at Charlotte, N.C., 982 F. Supp. 1060 (D.S.C. 1996).
147 See, e.g., Springer v. United States, 641 F. Supp. 913 (D.S.C. 1986), affd, 819
F.2d 1139 (4th Cir. 1987).
148 14 C.F.R. § 91.3 (1999).
149 Hensley v. United States, 728 F. Supp. 716, 717 (SD. Fla. 1989).
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viding PIREPs, the court found that the pilot was responsible
and that the controllers had not contributed to the crash. 5 °
The Aeronautical Information Manual (AIM) teaches pilots
"about the limited ability of air traffic control radar to display
weather data. Pilots are also taught that air traffic control radar
does not depict turbulence."15 ' Pilots have been held responsible for: continuing to fly into thunderstorms despite adverse
5
5 2 flying into forecasted IFR conditions;
weather advisories;

1

penetrating a storm for over 100 miles; 54 flying into forecasted
deteriorating weather; 55 flying into forecasted IFR conditions; 15 6 flying into cloud-obscured terrain; a57 and failing to obtain a weather briefing and crashing on a VFR flight into
as being in the best poclouds.' 8 Pilots are routinely "regarded
1 59
sition to judge outside conditions."

One of the earliest cases examining the relationship between
a general aviation pilot and air traffic controllers is Kullberg v.
United States.1 60 In Kullberg, the estate of the deceased pilot,
Richard Kullberg, commenced an action alleging that the government had failed to provide adequate weather information
and vectoring services, causing the decedent, a VFR-only pilot,
to fly "inadvertently" into instrument meteorological conditions
(IMC).161

The district court held that the controllers had not

breached any duty to Kullberg because Kullberg continued his
flight in deteriorating conditions, failed to request weather advisories en route, deliberately flew into IMC conditions, and,
150 See id.

at 723.

151 Id. at 720. See, e.g., In re Air Crash at Dallas/Fort Worth Airport, 919 F.2d

1079 (5th Cir. 1991).
152 See Barbosa v. United States, 811 F.2d 1444, 1448 (11th Cir. 1987).

See Spaulding v. United States, 455 F.2d 222, 227 (9th Cir. 1972).
154 See Black v. United States, 441 F.2d 741, 744-46 (5th Cir. 1971).
155 See Davis v. United States, 643 F. Supp. 67, 77-78 (N.D. Ill. 1986), affd, 824
F.2d 549 (7th Cir. 1987).
156 See Lombard v. United States, 601 F. Supp. 10, 12 (E.D. Mo. 1984), affd,
767 F.2d 929 (8th Cir. 1985).
157 See Baker v. United States, 417 F. Supp. 471, 483-86 (W.D. Wash. 1975).
158 See De Vere v. True-Flite, Inc., 268 F. Supp. 226, 227-28 (E.D.N.C. 1967).
159 Beattie v. United States, 690 F. Supp. 1068, 1077 n.48 (D.D.C. 1988); see also
Brock v. United States, 596 F.2d 93 (4th Cir. 1979); Black v. United States, 441
F.2d at 741 (5th Cir. 1971); American Airlines, Inc. v. United States, 418 F.2d 180
(5th Cir. 1969).
160 271 F. Supp. 788 (W.D. Pa. 1964).
161 See id. at 789-90.
153
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although not certified for instrument flight, attempted to fly an
instrument approach.' 6
That reasoning was followed by the Fifth Circuit in In re Crash
At DallasFort Worth Airport. 63 In affirming the district court, the
Fifth Circuit stated: "The [District] Court's finding that the
crew's deliberate decision to land through a known thunderstorm located at the end of the runway, when they could easily
have gone around, was the sole proximate cause of this disaster
is not clearly erroneous."' 64 The airline claimed that the crash
was caused by the controllers who failed to provide pertinent
weather information. While the Court found the controllers
negligent for failing to relay weather information to the crew, it
held that their negligence was not a proximate cause of the crash.165
V. CONCLUSION
Preparation, as in any litigation, is key. Knowing the prevailing weather conditions, the other data that was or could have
been available to the cabin crew, and the applicable law will enable the lawyer to properly and thoroughly handle the turbulence case.

See id. at 800.
919 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1991).
1-64See id. at 1088.
165 See id. The district court found that it was negligent for the air traffic controllers not to relay the following: a thunderstorm off the approach end of the
162
163

runway threshold; "heavy, heavy rain" (described by witnesses as a curtain of
water) observable from the Tower; cloud to ground lightning strikes; cumulonimbus clouds reported to Tower personnel; and radar information showing precipitation on the north end of the runway. See id. at 1085.

